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Executive summary
This paper studies the effects of a reference price reform in Denmark on price and demand for
statins, products that reduce the blood cholesterol levels. Too high cholesterol levels may cause
cardiovascular diseases. Reference pricing is a cost containment tool that is applied to reduce
health expenditures in 19 European countries as well as Australia, British Columbia and New
Zealand.
Our paper is the first to combine price data and demand data to study reform effects. We produce
estimates for changes in total government (health care) expenditures, patient expenditures, pa-
tient welfare and producer revenues.  
A main finding is that government and patients did indeed benefit in terms of price declines and
declining total expenditures from the reform while producers incurred losses. 
There are, however, striking differences between products that were “cheap” before the reform
and those that were “expensive” before the change. The benefits to patients and the government
were primarily due to the initially expensive products. The reform effects were hence quite 
asymmetrically distributed across products (and thus patients).
We also show that an empirical analysis of the reform effects that studies price changes only may
lead to quite misleading implications for welfare analysis.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Diese Arbeit analysiert die Auswirkungen einer Reform des Referenzpreissystems in Dänemark
auf Preise und Nachfrage von Statinen, Produkte, die den Cholesteringehalt des Blutes reduzie-
ren. Zu hohe Cholesterinwerte können mit dem Herz- Kreislaufsystem hervorrufen. Referenz-
preise werden in 19 europäischen Ländern sowie Australien, British Columbia und Neuseeland.
Unsere Arbeit ist die erste, die Preis- und Mengendaten gemeinsam analysiert, um Reform -
effekte zu berechnen. Wir ermitteln die Veränderungen in Gesundheitsausgaben, den Patien-
ten-Zuzahlungen, der Patienten-Wohlfahrt und den Erlösen der Hersteller. 
Ein Hauptresultat ist, dass das Gesundheitssystem und die Patienten von der Reform profitiert
haben in Termini von gesunkenen Preises und Gesamtausgaben. Die Hersteller der Medika-
mente haben hingegen Verluste erlitten.
Es bestehen allerdings grosse Unterschiede in der Verteilung der Veränderungen. Produkte, 
die vor der Reform relativ billig waren, haben ihre Preise wesentlich weniger gesenkt (bzw.
sogar erhöht) als solche, die vor der Reform teuer waren. Die Verbesserung der Situation von
Patienten und dem Gesundheitssystem ist vor allem den Produkten zu verdanken, die vor der
Reform relativ teuer waren. Die Reformeffekte sind also sehr asymmetrisch verteilt über die
Produkte (und daher auch über die Patienten)
Wir zeigen ebenso, dass eine Analyse von Reformeffekten, die alleine auf Preisen beruht, zu
recht irreführenden Wohlfahrtsimplikationen mündet.
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1 Introduction
Given steady growth in life expectancy, aging populations in many countries, and the
expected launch of new and ever more expensive medical treatments, expenditures
for pharmaceutical products are expected to increase substantially in the years to
come. This has led (and continues to lead) governments around the world to regu-
late the market for pharmaceuticals using cost containment tools such as price caps,
price agreements with producers, generic substitution schemes, prescription behavior
monitoring and reference prices.
Denmark, which maintains a universal coverage health care system, introduced
reference pricing in 1993 whereby a patient is reimbursed a fraction of the retail price
when buying a prescription drug. Prior to April 1, 2005, the reference price was
calculated as the minimum of either the list price a product’s own substitution group
or the respective European average price. In general, for products where the Danish
prices were below the European average price, patients had little incentive to buy the
cheapest product because the public health insurance paid the major part of the price
difference between the cheapest product and the desired substitute. To increase the
price sensitivity of patients and to sharpen competition, reference prices were changed
to be the minimum Danish price among products in the same substitution group on
April 1, 2005.1 This paper investigates the effects of this reference price reform.
The use of reference pricing as an indirect tool for controlling prices was first in-
troduced in Germany in 1989, and it has been adopted by many European countries
since then. In a recent survey, Puig-Junoy (2010) reports that 19 out of 26 European
countries use reference pricing. Outside Europe, reference pricing is applied in Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and in the Canadian province of British Columbia (Heuer et al.,
2007). Economic evidence of the effects of reference pricing is somewhat scarce, but
the literature has generally shown that the introduction of reference pricing reduces
prices (Brekke et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kanavos et al., 2008; Pavcnik, 2002).2 However,
the insights that these studies provide is limited by the fact that they either only
look at price effects (Brekke et al. 2009a; Kanavos et al., 2008; Pavcnik, 2002) or the
quantity effects of reference pricing (Kanavos et al., 2008; Puig-Junoy, 2007).3
From these studies, it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding the effects of
reference pricing based on the surplus of the parties involved because this requires a
1In Denmark, a substitution group is defined by the Danish Medicine Agency (DKMA) as products based on
the same molecule of the same strength with the same administration form and a similar package size.
2Puig-Junoy (2010) performs an extensive literature search and find only seven empirical studies on reference
pricing, of which only three use econometric techniques.
3Brekke et al. (2009b) regress the average prices, market shares and average molecule prices on the number of
products subject to reference pricing.
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joint analysis of price and quantity effects. In this paper, we take a step forward by
estimating a demand model that allows us to measure the effect of the Danish reference
price reform on patients, producers, and public health insurance. Moreover, as this is
the first paper to estimate product-specific rather than average reform effects, we are
able to study asymmetric reactions to the reform between high-priced and low-priced
products.
We confine our analysis to statins, which are lipid modifying agents (LMAs) that
are used to treat high levels of cholesterol. The best known statins sell under the
names “Lipitor” and “Zocor.” Statins grew massively in popularity in Denmark after
a large-scale medical trial in Scandinavia in the 1990s showed that treatment with
simvastatin, the most popular statin, decreases mortality and morbidity of patients
with cardiovascular diseases (Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study Group, 1994).
Statins are widely prescribed drugs today and have experienced rapidly increasing
demand in the past years all over the world. They currently constitute the best-selling
drugs in terms of sales both in Denmark and worldwide.
Our empirical strategy is to first estimate the product-specific effect of the reform
on prices of a so-called “Defined Daily Dose” using the Pooled Mean Group Estimator
suggested by Pesaran and Smith (1995).4 Second, we estimate a structural model for
the demand for statins using a nested logit model of product differentiation (Anderson
et al. 1992; Berry 1994), a standard discrete choice model with random consumer
utility. Third, we map the estimated price effects of the reform to our demand system
estimates to find the demand changes that the health care reform induced. Finally,
we calculate the total changes in patient co-payments, patient surplus, government
expenditures and producer revenues. We hence predict the changes the reform would
have had had it been implemented in the base period already. The counter-factual
question we ask is “what would the market have looked like had the reform been
implemented under the conditions of the base period?” By constructing a counter-
factual base period market from our estimated price changes, we effectively “filter out”
any changes in the market that was not induced by the reform.
We should note that our study is confined to the effects of the reform on those
products that were on the market both before and after the reform; i.e., we are con-
cerned with the so-called “treatment effect on the treated” as it is referred to in the
program evaluation literature. Thus, similar to existing related studies, we are unable
to draw any inference about products that entered or left the market after the reform
was implemented.
4A “Defined Daily Dosage” (DDD) is a unit of measure of drug consumption issued by the World Health
Organization that is used to standardize the comparative usage of drugs. A DDD is assumed to be the average
dose per day for a drug when used for its main indication in adults.
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Our results support previous studies by finding a substantial decrease in prices
after the reform. List prices decreased by 26.6 percent on average, and reference prices
decreased 31.8 percent on average. The average decrease in co-payments is estimated
at 7.5 percent. These price changes are associated with an increase in total demand by
1.9 percent per 14 days, which is the periodicity of our data. Total producer revenues
decreased by 5 percent, total government expenditures decreased by 5.6 percent, and
total patient expenditures decreased by 3 percent. Finally, patient surplus increased
by 8.2 percent.
Our estimates for the full reform effect take into account the fact that changes in
demand patterns differ substantially from the findings we obtain when we assume that
demand stays constant. Indeed, if patients had not reacted to the price changes the re-
form brought about by changing their consumption behavior, their total expenditures
would have increased by as much as 10.2 percent. Similarly, government expenditures
and producer revenues would have increased by 14.9 percent and 13.7 percent, respec-
tively. This illustrates the importance of considering both price and quantity effects
when evaluating the effects of the regulatory reform in health care.
The price effects of a reform are large but also quite asymmetrically distributed
across products, which is an aspect that our fully flexible price estimation method is
able to capture. The list prices of the initially cheap products in a substitution group
decreased by 5.8 percent, and they decreased by as much as 44.4 percent for the ini-
tially expensive products. This asymmetry in the effects between initially high-priced
and initially low-priced products implies that patients who purchased cheap products
before the reform were actually made worse off, while patients who initially bought the
initially more expensive products were made substantially better off. Furthermore, we
also find that list prices and reference prices decreased substantially more for prod-
ucts belonging to the expensive substitution groups than for products belonging to the
cheap substitution groups. Our results show that the Danish reference price reform
led to significant total gains for patients and public health insurance but that they
are, however, asymmetrically distributed.
The question remains as to what extent these results can be generalized to other
countries. While the national rules and regulations concerning, e.g., generic substitu-
tion and mark-ups by pharmacies undoubtedly are important for the size of the gains
that reference pricing can bring about, we believe that the Danish experience contains
some general insights regarding how a reference price should be chosen. In particular,
we argue that defining the lowest price in the substitution group as the reference price
has a number of attractive properties that stimulate competition and bring down the
prices of off-patent drugs. First, because patients pay the full price difference out-of-
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pocket when buying a product that is not the cheapest one, they are as price sensitive
as they would be without reimbursement from the health insurance. A price elastic
demand, in turn, results in tougher competition and lower prices. Second, using the
European average price, or any other external benchmark, as the reference price makes
demand more price elastic above the reference price than below it. This introduces
a tendency for prices to cluster at the reference price (Danzon and Liu, 1998). For
such a system to work well, it requires that policy makers are able to perform the
difficult task of setting reference prices close to the competitive level; this is a problem
that they do not face when the reference price is defined as the lowest price in the
substitution group. In this sense, the Danish reference price reform shows that the
best institution at setting competitive prices is the market.5
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing related literature,
and Section 3 provides an overview of the market for pharmaceutical products and
introduces the Danish institutional setting. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
provides some theoretical considerations and Section 6 describes the reform effects on
prices. Section 7 describes the empirical strategy. Section 8 presents our estimation
results and discusses some policy implications. Section 9 provides a robustness check
and Section 10 concludes.
2 Existing studies
This section discusses the studies mentioned in the Introduction in more detail and
briefly reviews other papers relevant to our analysis. As the first paper that investi-
gated the implementation of reference pricing, Pavcnik (2002) finds price reductions
of 10 to 26 percent following the introduction of reference pricing in Germany in 1989.
In their cross-country analysis, Kanavos et al. (2008) study the effects of reference
pricing on the number of competing producers, the originator price, the generic price,
the lowest price of generic products, and total sales volumes. They find that reference
pricing encourages generic entry and reduces the prices of generic products. The aver-
age price reduction of the generic products is between 2 and 3 percent, but the price of
the cheapest product is reduced by as much as 47 percent. Puig-Junoy (2007) analyzes
the effects of a series of reference price reforms on the demand for statins, which is
5A number of solutions to the problem of setting references prices have been implemented in different countries;
see O¨BIG (2008). In Germany, reference prices are set by the Association of Sickness Funds (BKK) using a
hedonic price estimation procedure that is subject to the restriction that the reference price must be within the
33rd percentile of the price distribution. The Netherlands, which defines substitution groups based on therapeutic
effects, defined the 1990 median price of a daily dose in the substitution group as the reference price. These 1990-
indexed reference prices were kept until 1999. In Portugal, the reference price is defined as the price of the most
expensive generic product in the substitution group.
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also the product considered in this paper, in Spain and its province Andalusia. He
regresses total demand for statins on a set of dummy variables for the adoption of
reforms by the respective regions. His analysis lacks counterfactual price data, and it
is thus implicitly assumed that the coefficients on the time dummy variables are solely
driven by the reform. In contrast, our demand estimates relate to the period before
the reform only so that we remove any other events that may have occurred after the
reform was implemented.
Related to our paper, albeit less directly, there is a series of papers that study the
effects of a switch from price cap regulation to reference pricing in Norway. These pa-
pers confirm the efficiency of reference pricing in bringing the prices of pharmaceutical
products down and show how the Norwegian reform resulted in a substantial decrease
in prices (Brekke et al., 2009a, 2009b) as well as in a reduction in producer market
power (Dalen et al., 2006). Finally, there are a number of papers that study the effects
of reference pricing in game-theory frameworks. A variety of issues have been ana-
lyzed, such as the effects of different choices of reference prices on equilibrium price
levels (Mestre-Ferra´ndiz, 2003; Merino-Castello´, 2003), the choice between generic and
therapeutic substitution groups (Brekke et al., 2007), and so-called “ratchet effects”
resulting from reference pricing (Miraldo, 2009).
3 The Danish market for pharmaceutical products
3.1 General settings
As in other European countries, the market for pharmaceutical products in Denmark
is regulated. Denmark follows European regulations regarding product authorization.
Product pricing, reimbursement rules and the regulation of pharmacies are national
matters. The number of pharmacies, their location and total gross profit is determined
by the Danish Ministry of Health and Prevention. Prices for prescription-only prod-
ucts are identical nationwide. However, pharmacies may compete on over-the-counter
products, which may also be sold by non-pharmacies.
The pricing of pharmaceutical products in Denmark is free in the sense that produc-
ers are not tied to any regulation regarding price-setting. However, they are required
to notify their pharmacy purchase price to the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA)
every 14 days.
In Denmark, every resident is entitled to free and equal access to tax-supported
health care services regardless of her employment status or health status. In the
provision of pharmaceutical products, the government reimburses expenditures for
prescription drugs based on the respective reference price.
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Even though the popularity of additional private insurance has increased lately, it
was not very common during the period we study. In 2000, over 70 percent of the
population was covered only by the statutory health insurance. The dominant player in
private insurance, which practically held a monopoly, is “Sygeforsikringen Danmark.”
Its most popular insurance plan pays 50 percent of the patient’s co-payments and
covers 80 percent of all subscribers to Sygeforsikringen Danmark. We do not have
information on private insurance membership, which means that we cannot address
possible selection problems arising from additional private coverage. We speculate
that the problem of the possible existence of private insurance is not an important
one because the fraction of private insurance subscribers is small and because it is not
clear if more healthy individuals subscribe to private insurance (i.e., in order to hedge
against future illness and because they have no difficulties being admitted) or if less
healthy individuals subscribe (i.e., to reduce their patient co-payments).
3.2 Pharmacies and physician incentives
It is important to note that neither pharmacies nor physicians have any incentives
to sell patients a particular product. First, advertising prescription drugs to patients
is prohibited in Denmark. Second, detailing of established drugs such as statins is
regulated and does not appear to play an important role. We lack concise information
about detailing, but based on conversations with many health professionals, we believe
that detailing rarely occurs, and when it does occur, it is related to drugs that are
new to the Danish market. Third, pharmacy profits from selling prescription drugs
are set by the government and are independent of the prices at which the drugs are
being sold.
3.3 List prices and co-payments
Our data set contains fortnightly prices and sales of statins for the period between
September 15, 2003, and October 9, 2006. Our price data, including reference prices,
can be downloaded from www.medicinpriser.dk.
Patient co-payments for statins are defined as pc = pl − (0.8 pr), where pc denotes
the patient co-payment, pl is the list price, and pr denotes the price of the reference
product. The minimum co-payment for each patient is 20 percent of the list price
(when list prices and reference prices coincide). The reimbursement rate actually de-
pends on a patient’s total expenses for pharmaceutical products. However, according
to our medical advisors, patients who receive statin treatment easily exceed the ex-
penditures threshold needed to obtain a reimbursement rate of 80 percent, even if they
always buy the cheapest statin. In addition, many patients treated with statins need
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to take other products for cardiovascular diseases like blood thinners or beta blockers,
thus increasing their expenditures further. The co-payment fraction is unaffected by
the health care reform.
3.4 The April 2005 reference price reform
The reform that this paper investigates involves the change in the way reference prices,
pr, are calculated. Before April 1, 2005, reference prices were based on average prices
among the EU-15 members, excluding Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal. The
reference price for a given product was the minimum EU-15 average price among the
products belonging to the same substitution group, pEU .6 However, if a product’s list
price, pl was below pEU , the reference price was equal to the list price.7 Since April
2005, the reference price for a product is the minimum domestic price among the
products belonging to the same substitution group, plmin, and is updated fortnightly
as the new prices are announced. More formally, reference prices before the reform,
prbefore, and references prices after the reform, p
r
after, are defined as follows:
prbefore =
 pEU if pl ≥ pEUpl otherwise
prafter = p
l
min,
To favor generic substitution, the so-called “G Scheme” was introduced in 2001.
This scheme states that pharmacists are obligated to dispense the cheapest product
within a group of substitutes unless the prescription explicitly requires no substitution,
which is the case for just 5 percent of all prescriptions, or the patient explicitly requests
another product. If the patient prefers a more expensive product, she must pay the
difference out of her own pocket. Table 1 provides an example. Suppose a patient can
choose among three products A, B and C. Before the reform, the patient obtains the
maximal reimbursement rate when buying products A and B. After the reform, the
reference price is equal to the price of the cheapest product in Denmark (prAfter = 100
DKK), and the patient only obtains the maximal reimbursement rate when buying
product A.
6If a European average price did not exist for a product, the reference price was set to be equal to the list price
of the cheapest domestic product. For parallel imports, the reference price was defined as the reference price of the
directly traded product.
7According to a report by the Danish Ministry of Health from 2004, 74 percent of the packages sold on the
Danish market were cheaper than the corresponding European package.
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Table 1: Example of the calculation of co–payments
Product pl pEU prbefore p
r
after p
c
before p
c
after
A 100 150 100 100 20 20
B 150 150 150 100 30 70
C 200 150 120 100 80 120
3.5 Definition of base and treatment periods
Our empirical analysis is an event study; we investigate changes in pharmaceutical
pricing and demand before and after the change in the reimbursement system. There
are two relevant dates set by the Danish government. In October 2004, the Danish
parliament ratified the new reimbursement law, and on April 1, 2005, the law was
implemented.
It is likely that information regarding changes in reimbursement rules had been at
the disposal of market participants prior to these two legislatively determined dates.
To further investigate this issue, we consulted newspaper and trade press archives by
searching for appropriate keywords. It turned out that the Danish Minister of Health
announced the assembly of a group of experts with the aim of changing the existing
reimbursement system to strengthen competition on September 17, 2003. Moreover,
as a member of the working group, the Danish Association of the Pharmaceutical
Industry (Lægemiddel Industri Foreningen, LIF) launched the idea of changing the
way reference prices are calculated, as was eventually adopted in April 2005.
Between May 2001 and April 2003, LIF maintained an agreement on price ceilings,
which was, however, not followed by all LIF members. After the expiration of the
agreement, LIF announced a continuation of the price ceiling for another two years.
This was a unilateral announcement on the side of LIF rather than an official agreement
with the Danish Ministry of Health. As LIF experienced problems enforcing the
previous, legally binding agreement, there likely was considerable uncertainty in the
market regarding the credibility of the announcement. For this reason, we believe that
the announcement by LIF did not influence price-setting in the market in an important
way.8 Finally, the Danish Ministry of Health and LIF again signed an agreement on
a price ceiling in October 2006.
After the price ceiling agreement between LIF and the Danish government expired
on June 25, 2003, LIF announced a unilateral extension of the price ceiling for another
two years.
8If the announcement did influence prices, it could either be as a price ceiling that kept prices down or as a
coordination device that allowed producers to sustain higher prices. Still, the volatile market structure suggests
that price coordination is difficult to sustain (Tirole, 1988).
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Notwithstanding, we cannot exclude the possibility that the LIF announcement
allowed producers in the market to coordinate higher prices levels (Knittel and Stango,
2003). However, uncertainty regarding the credibility of the LIF announcement, as
well as the volatile market structure following the patent expiration at the end of
2002, suggest that price coordination was difficult to sustain. For this reason, we
interpret the price development as being the result of the reference price reform, but
we are not able to separate the effects of the reform from the possible effects of the
LIF announcement.
Insert Table 2 about here.
All five of these events (namely, the expiration of the first LIF pricing agreement,
the assembly of the working group, the passing of the reform in parliament, the imple-
mentation of the reform and the new LIF pricing agreement) are summarized in Table
2 and shown in Figure 1. This figure plots the number of producers in the market for
statins and the median list prices against time. Six different time periods are defined
by these events, including the “LIF agreement expiration period,” the “adjustment pe-
riod,” the “base period/working group assembly period,” the “announcement period,”
the “implementation period” and the “new LIF agreement period.” We discard the
two LIF agreement periods as well as the adjustment period after the expiration of the
first LIF agreement to avoid including effects other than the actual reform. We define
our base period as the period between the working group assembly and the ratification
in parliament because it constitutes a period during which there was no information
about prospective changes in the reimbursement system and because, presumably for
that reason, the number of producers as well as prices remained stable. The “imple-
mentation period” constitutes our treatment period. We discard the “announcement
period” because it most likely just was a transition period for the producers to prepare
for a new competitive setting.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
4 Data
4.1 Definitions
Product definition
The aim of any treatment with LMAs is to reduce both the total cholesterol level to
below 5 millimol per liter of blood (mmol/l) and the level of LDL cholesterol, which
is a particularly harmful type of cholesterol, to below 3 mmol/l. A few weeks after a
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LMA treatment has been started, medical practitioners re-evaluate cholesterol levels
and may adjust the treatment based on any new information.
Each pharmaceutical product is characterized by its name, package size, admin-
istration form, strength, anatomical therapeutic chemical classification code (ATC
code) and producer name. A product may, for example, be defined as “Zocor” with
98 tablets a` 20 milligram of the active substance simvastatin (ATC C10AA01), pro-
duced by Merck Sharp & Dohme. The ATC-code is a combination of seven letters and
numbers that precisely describes a product’s active substance.
The products we consider are all pills, coated pills or capsules. The smallest package
size is 30 pills, and the largest one is 250 pills. The strength of the products, which
is defined as the amount of active substance per pill, also varies considerably, namely,
from 5 milligrams to 80 milligrams per pill.
To make comparable the different strengths, package sizes and active ingredients,
we converted prices and quantities into DDD.9
A total of 95 products existed in the base period, announcement and implementa-
tion periods. These constitute the products for which we estimated the reference price
reform effects.10
Appendix A contains a characterization of statins in terms of their ATC code.
Statins are paneled into eight different ATC classes, of which six are marketed in
Denmark. Statins are not the only LMAs; there exist others, such as fibrates or
nicotinic acid. However, according to the “Institute of Rational Pharmacotherapy”
(Institut for Rational Farmakoterapi, IRF), which is a governmental agency under
DKMA, these products are only prescribed under special circumstances, for example,
because of intolerance to statins or if the patient has very high levels of triglycerides,
a lipid that is very harmful to the coronary system.
Medical practitioners must request health insurance subsidies for statins from
DKMA for their patients, which is a formality if critical cholesterol levels exceed a
given threshold. Health insurance subsidies for LMAs other than statins must be
applied for with a separate request.
Appendix B displays the market shares of LMAs corresponding to each four digit
ATC code. This shows that the market share of statins is well above 90 percent during
the relevant time period.
9An earlier version of this paper measured prices and quantities in per-pill units instead of DDD. This led to
qualitatively similar but larger effects of the reform.
10Our price change estimations include 90 products only because five products did not change their price at all
in the base period or the treatment period so that parameter estimates for these products could not be obtained.
In the reform effect analysis that follows, we substitute the missing price changes with observed price changes for
these products.
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Prescription behavior
We spoke to medical practitioners from internal medicine and neurology as well as
to a general practitioner about their prescription behavior. When treating a patient,
they follow the recommendations issued by IRF and simultaneously choose the active
ingredient and dosage.
Substitutes
Patients can only substitute among products with the same active substance and
strength as indicated by the prescription.11
Medical practitioners in Denmark tend to regard all statins as perfect substitutes,
at least with respect to their effects on cholesterol levels and slightly less so with
respect to their resorption. Indeed, IRF (2003) discusses a “group effect” of statins,
which means that the effect of statins is independent of the specific choice of statin,
which reinforces doctors’ perceptions of statins as highly substitutable. In fact, doctors
may substitute, for example, one daily pill of simvastatin 40mg with either two pills
of simvastatin 20mg or a half pill of simvastatin 80mg.
It is not clear a priori if and to what extent Danish medical doctors and patients are
price sensitive. IRF does, however, issue recommendations to substitute one product
by another if (i) it has been demonstrated in clinical studies that the effects are
identical, and (ii) one of the products is substantially cheaper than the other. For
example, in 2008, IRF made an explicit recommendation to substitute the statin
atorvastatin 10mg with another statin, simvastatin 40mg (IRF 2008).
If doctors and patients decide that medical treatment is needed, doctors decide
which product group (ATC group) to take based on the medical record of the patient
and possible intolerance to one or more of the ingredients. For example, the doctor
may first decide to prescribe simvastatin. Given that choice, she then decides on
the strength of the product to be taken given the deviation between the actual and
targeted cholesterol level as well as the weight and gender of the patient, for example,
40mg of simvastatin. Given the product group and strength combination, patients
decide which of the products within this combination to buy. In the case of 40mg
simvastatin, they may chose from 12 different products.
4.2 Source
Prices, reimbursement status and other product characteristics are published at www.medicinpriser.dk.
The website, which is maintained by DKMA, has been available since 1998. It con-
tains, however, only data for five consecutive years at any point in time.
11The Danish definition of substitute groups includes package size, but package size may not vary by more than
ten percent within substitution groups.
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The site publishes a list of all authorized pharmaceutical products marketed in
Denmark. Prices are updated every second Monday based on changes reported by
producers during the last two weeks since February 2003. The database is publicly
available and was created to help citizens calculate their reimbursement rates and to
inform them about alternative substitution options. The site www.medicinpriser.dk
is also used by general practitioners when issuing prescriptions, by hospitals for their
electronic patient records and by pharmacies to ensure uniform prices for prescription
drugs at a national level.
We merged the fortnightly pharmacy retail prices with information on sales vol-
umes. Our sales volume data are proprietary and were made available to us by LIF.
These data have the same periodicity as the price data. Table 3 presents a descrip-
tive overview of prices and the competitiveness of the statins market during the two
considered periods. Prices are in 2005 Danish Crowns (DKK). Table 3 contains infor-
mation on all statins, not just those that were on the market both before and after
the reform.
Insert Table 3 about here.
List prices per DDD decreased on average by 35 percent from the base period to the
implementation period. Reference prices decreased by 39 percent on average, while
co-payment prices decreased by 12 percent on average after implementation. Sales,
measured in DDD sold every 14 days, increased by four percent on average.
The average number of products in each period varied between 125 and 126, while
the average number of producers in each period increased over time from 19 to 23.
Producers that belong to the same company form a conglomerate. There were 15 to
16 conglomerates at any point in time.
While the share of branded products steadily decreased over all periods, the two
measures of concentration (namely, the Herfindahl Index and the three-firm concen-
tration ratio) increased over time, reaching averages of 0.26 and 0.7, respectively.
5 Theoretical considerations
To better interpret the later empirical results, we find it useful to outline the expected
effects of the reform. This discussion is partly based on Kaiser et al. (2010), who
analyze the effects of the Danish reference price reform using a simple Hotelling model
of competition.12 Because the reference price is defined at the level of substitution
12There are several papers that analyze the effects of reference pricing. However, Kaiser et al. (2010) is, to our
knowledge, the only paper that compares the specific systems used in Denmark before and after the reform.
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groups, we focus primarily on the effects of the reform on intra-substitution group
competition.
We organize our discussion along two dimensions, namely, (1) substitution groups
with a minimum list price, plmin, below, above or equal to the reference price, p
EU ,
before the reference price reform and (2) marginal and infra-marginal patients. In line
with our discrete choice model of demand, marginal patients are defined as those for
whom the relevant choice is whether or not to buy any statin or, to use the words
of the demand model discussed in Subsection 7.1, whether to buy one of the “inside
goods” or an “outside good.” Instead, the relevant choice for infra-marginal patients
is which product to buy.13
5.1 Substitution groups where plmin < p
EU
Let us start by considering substitution groups with two or more products. Before
the reference price reform on April 1, 2005, there was an external reference price,
pEU . This meant that the incentives of infra-marginal patients to choose the cheapest
product were muted if plmin < p
EU because the patients only paid a fraction of the
price difference when buying a more expensive product (i.e., 20 percent of the price
difference up to pEU −plmin and 100 percent thereafter). An implication of this system
is that demand is less price elastic below pEU than above this threshold (Danzon and
Liu, 1998). After the reform, the infra-marginal patients paid the full price difference
out-of-pocket when buying a more expensive product. We expect this change to make
the infra-marginal patients more price sensitive, thereby increasing competition for
these patients. Regarding the marginal patients, they look at absolute co-payments
rather than price differences when making their purchase decisions. The reform re-
sults in higher co-payments at pre-reform list prices due to lower reimbursement from
public health insurance. Higher patient co-payments, in turn, translate into a demand
reduction from the marginal patients. We expect both intensified competition for
infra-marginal patients and the demand reduction of marginal patients to result in
lower prices after the reform.
In substitution groups with only one product, all patients are marginal by def-
inition. Some of these patients stop buying the product at pre-reform prices after
the reform due to the increased co-payment. Again, this corresponds to a demand
reduction resulting from the reform, which we expect to result in a lower price.
13This way of conceptualizing competition inside a substitution group is similar to the framework used in Miraldo
(2009). She models the market as a Hotelling line with open ends, with firms located at zero and one. In her model,
the infra-marginal patients are those located between the firms and, the marginal patients are those located at the
borders of the market.
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5.2 Substitution groups where plmin>p
EU
In substitution groups with two products or more, the reference price reform does not
affect competition for the infra-marginal patients because these patients were already
paying the full price difference between any two products before April 1, 2005. Hence,
the effects of the reform are driven by the change in the demand of the marginal
patients in all substitution groups. Because plmin > p
EU , the reference price reform
results in a larger reimbursement of and lower co-payments for the pre-reform list
prices. We expected this to increase the demand of marginal patients and to result in
higher prices after the reform.
5.3 Substitution groups where plmin=p
EU
In substitution groups where plmin=p
EU , the reference price and the co-payments do
not change as a result of the reform with respect to pre-reform list prices.
Furthermore, the patients paid the full price difference between any two products
already before the reform. Hence, following this logic, the reference price reform
changes neither competition for marginal patients nor competition for infra-marginal
patients. We expect the reform to have no effect on prices and demand here.
5.4 Discussion
The discussion above outlines the effects of the reform on prices across different sub-
stitution groups. Still, there are a number of other factors that could moderate these
effects.
First, we focused on intra-substitution group competition in the discussion. This
corresponds to competition resulting from patients who are issued a prescription by a
medical practitioner such that a switch to a different substitution group is no longer
possible, at least not without another visit to a medical practitioner. It is likely
that the medical practitioner and the patient consider the price levels in the different
substitution groups before a prescription is issued, e.g., by choosing among pills of
different strengths or packages of different sizes. If so, this introduces inter-substitution
group competition. We expect such competition to reduce price levels generally and
specifically to reduce the price differences between substitution groups that result from
the reform.
Second, it is possible that producers operating in several national markets are reluc-
tant to decrease their prices on the Danish market in order to keep prices up on other
markets. A low price on the Danish market may, e.g., undermine a firm’s bargaining
position when negotiating prices with other health authorities or may reduce reference
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prices calculated on the basis of international prices. We expect this to make produc-
ers reluctant to reduce prices but willing to increase prices after the reform, which
should thus work against finding a negative average effect of the reform on prices.
Third, increasing and decreasing prices should induce entry and exit, respectively.
We expect that this endogenous adjustment in the market structure due to the reform
reduces the magnitude but not the sign of the price changes discussed above.
6 Price effects of the reform
6.1 Price effects
Changes in list prices
The central prices to consider in the Danish health care market are the list prices
because the reference prices (at least after the reform) as well as co-payments are me-
chanically derived from the list price as described in Subsection 3.3. We therefore link
the effect of the change in the reference price system to the list price of each product
during the base and treatment periods. We acknowledge that the reform effects may
be widely divergent across products, which is why we allow for full flexibility in our
estimates by allowing the mean reform effects to be different for different products. In
other words, we estimate average changes between the base period and the treatment
period, product-by-product. We do so by regressing list prices per DDD on a constant
term and a dummy variable for the treatment period. The corresponding parameter
estimate constitutes our product-specific estimate for the effects of the reference price
reform on list prices. Our estimated price changes combine the “direct” effect of health
care reform through changes in the pricing strategy of producers as well as “indirect”
effects arising from entry and exit, possibly induced by the reform.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Table 4 displays PMGE and fixed effects estimation results for our regressions
of dummy variables for the implementation (that is, treatment) period as well as a
constant term. The estimation involves 90 products that existed both during the base
and implementation periods that were observed at least two times in each period to
have a sufficient product-specific time series of prices. There is little difference in the
point estimates of the PMGE and the fixed effects results, but standard errors are
smaller for the fixed effects estimation, which is a direct consequence of fixed effects
imposing more structure on the data. We shall use the product-specific estimation
results in the following analysis. Our discussion refers to the PMGE results in Table
4. The table shows that the reform was associated with a highly statistically significant
general decrease in prices per DDD of 1.8 DKK.
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Our interest is, however, not only in the average effect of the reform on list prices
per DDD but also in the distribution of these effects within and across substitution
groups. The theoretical considerations in Section 5 suggest that prices decrease in
substitution groups where plmin < p
EU and increase in substitution groups where
plmin > p
EU as a result of the reform. We must deal with two issues when defining
initially cheap and initially expensive products empirically. First, we cannot observe
pEU directly. For this reason, we have to divide the substitution groups into those
for which plmin≤pEU (hereafter termed the “cheap” substitution groups) and those for
which plmin > p
EU (hereafter termed the “expensive” substitution groups). Note that
as we expect no effect from the reform on prices in the substitution groups for which
plmin = p
EU , we expect a price reduction on average in the cheap substitution groups.
Second, prices vary within our base period. Some substitution groups may therefore
sometimes be categorized as cheap while at other times as expensive. We choose a
very conservative definition of the two groups; a substitution group is termed cheap if
the list price of at least one product within that group is smaller or equal to the EU
average (pl≤pEU ) in all periods. Otherwise, it is expensive.
Theoretical predictions and empirical findings
In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that prices decreased in the cheap
substitution groups during the implementation period. However, contrary to our pre-
dictions, prices decreased even more strongly in the expensive substitution groups.
We explain this divergence between the theoretical predictions and empirical results
by noting that the market had not reached its equilibrium market structure in all sub-
stitution groups before the reform, which is an implicit assumption in the theoretical
discussion. In particular, high prices in the expensive substitution groups would prob-
ably have led to entry, e.g., by generic producers and parallel importers, regardless
of the reform. If so, the strong decrease in prices can be explained by entry exoge-
nous to the reform. This same argument suggests that there would have been exits
from the cheap substitution groups without the reform. Therefore, we are likely to
underestimate the price decrease due to the reform in these substitution groups. This
explanation for the observed price patterns is supported by the fact that the average
difference in the number of products in the cheap and in the expensive substitution
groups is 3.5 (i.e., there are 3.5 more products in the cheap group than in the expen-
sive group) in the base period but is only 0.9 in the implementation period. There is
convergence in competitive pressure across substitution groups, which probably would
have also occurred regardless of the reform.
Asymmetric price effects
Turning to asymmetric effects of the reform on prices within substitution groups, we
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define cheap and expensive products as products for which pl≤pEU and pl > pEU ,
respectively. Again, the two groups are conservatively defined. A product is cheap if
pl≤pEU for all periods within the base period. Otherwise, it is defined as expensive.
The set of cheap products consists of 41 (of 90) products with a joint market share
of 67.5 percent. Relaxing the definition we adopt makes the findings for the two
substitution groups more similar.
While patients on average enjoyed a price decrease of 1.8 DKK between the base
period and the implementation period, our results from Table 4 indicate that the
reform had asymmetric effects across different products. The price of the expensive
products fell by 2.8 DKK, while the price of the cheap products fell by only 0.6 DKK
during the implementation period, indicating that patients who initially purchased
more expensive products gained considerably more from the reform than patients who
initially bought cheap products. Patients may, however, substitute across different
products, which implies that asymmetric price effects alone may not necessarily lead
to asymmetric effects on total patient expenditures and surplus. For this reason, we
study the full effect of the reform on patients in what follows.
Alternative scenarios
To further investigate the effects of the reform on reference prices, we consider three
different scenarios. In Scenario 1 we assume that both DDD list prices and demand
stay constant and that the only change that occurs in the system is the switch from
the calculation of reference prices based on European averages to the minimum do-
mestic price (which also changes the co-payment). This scenario does not require any
estimation and consists of a purely mechanical change in the calculation of reference
prices.
In Scenario 2, we assume that demand remains constant while list prices change
according to our product-specific estimates and that reference prices change as a conse-
quence of changes in list prices (and the way reference prices are calculated). Because
our estimated average effects of the reference price reform are basically product-specific
comparisons of mean prices across periods, Scenario 2 is (like Scenario 1) inherently
non-parametric.
Our final scenario, Scenario 3, is the most realistic one. In this scenario, we allow
list prices (and hence reference prices and co-payments), the way reference prices are
calculated and demand to change.
We shall discuss our findings for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 in the paragraphs
below. Scenario 3 is discussed in Section 7 because it involves demand estimation,
which requires further explanation.
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Scenario 1: Constant demand and list prices
Table 5 displays our results for Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. For Scenario 1, we find
an average decrease in reference prices of 4.1 percent. The effects of the reform differ
widely across products. The lowest 10 percent reference price changes are below -18.3
percent, while the top 10 percent largest reference price changes are above 5.4 percent.
The changes in co-payments reflect the changes in reference prices. The mean co-
payment change is 13.0 percent. Patient co-payments increase for more than half of
all products in Scenario 1. The total changes in government and patient expenditures
are estimated to be -1.3 percent and 3.7 percent, respectively, reflecting a co-payment
increase for more than half of all products. A change in the reference pricing system
alone that keeps list prices and demand patterns fixed hence leads to small savings in
government expenditures and to an increase in patient expenditures.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Scenario 2: Constant demand
In Scenario 2, we allow both for the mechanical change in the calculation of reference
prices and for list prices to adapt to the reform. To calculate the percentage changes
in list prices for Scenario 2, we use product-specific estimates from our PMGE esti-
mation. Table 5 shows that median list prices decrease by 24.8 percent, and mean
list prices decrease by 26.6 percent. The general decrease in list prices is reflected by
a general decrease in reference prices. Their median decrease is 35.2 percent, while
the corresponding mean is -31.8 percent. The median change in co-payments is -15.9
percent, while the mean change is -7.5 percent.
For Scenario 2, we estimate a change in total producer revenues of 13.7 percent, a
change in total government expenditures of 14.9 percent and a change in total patient
expenditures of 10.2 percent. That total producer revenues, government expenditures
and patient expenditures increase while median and mean prices decrease appears
to be a contradiction. At least 10 percent of the list and reference prices and at
least a quarter of the co-payments did, however, increase, and many of the best-
selling products, including Pfizer’s Lipitor, Ratiopharm’s Lovastatin and Sandoz’s
Simvastatin, raised their prices.
7 Empirical Strategy
Scenario 3 involves estimating a model of demand for differentiated products. We use
the estimates from this demand model along with the estimated changes in prices to
predict product demand in the treatment period. That is, we keep the set of available
products constant and infer demand for these products after the reform by combining
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price changes and demand function parameters. Our demand model includes all statins
that were available in the base period and uses prices, product characteristics and sales
data for all 21 fortnightly periods of the base period.
7.1 Demand Estimation
Basic setup
Our demand estimation aims at making predictions for the demand for statins if the
health care reform had already been introduced during the base period. We obviously
can only compute predicted changes in quantities induced by changes in prices for
products that already existed in the base period and that also existed in the treatment
period.
We use a nested logit model of demand for differentiated products as our empirical
workhorse. Our exposition of the nested logit model follows Berry (1994). We assume
that a physician chooses the statin that provides the patient with the highest utility
given the IRF recommendation.
Following our arguments in Subsection 4.1, we further assume that the physician
first determines the active ingredient (that is, ATC) and strength combination for each
patient i. This defines G groups of substitute products. Each of the G groups consists
of several products. Patients then decide which of the various products in the group
of substitutes to buy. They reach their purchasing decision by choosing the product
that maximizes their utility. Utility depends upon observed characteristics, xj , ex-
cluding price, pcj , which also determines utility but which is treated separately as well
as dummy variables for each of the G substitute groups (that is, ATC/strength combi-
nations), which are interacted with an individual-specific random term, ζig. Note that
this term is the random coefficient on the group dummies. Omitting time subscripts,
patient utility is given by:
uij = xjβ + αp
c
j + ξj +
G∑
j=0
djgζig + (1− σ)ij = δj +
G∑
j=0
djgζig + (1− σ)ij , (1)
where ij is assumed to be an iid Gumbel distributed distributed random variable.
The term δj is called “mean utility” because none of its components are patient-
specific. The only elements of vector xj are product-name dummy variables, which
also effectively represent producer-specific fixed effects. Examples of product names
are “Crestor,” “Lovastatin Alternova,” “Lovastatin Ratiopharm,” “Simvastatin Ra-
tiopharm,” “Simvastatin Sandoz,” “Simvastatin Teva,” “Zocolip” and “Zocor. All
other observed relevant product characteristics like active ingredient, package size and
strength are already accounted for by the group dummies djg. However, note that we
cannot include product-specific fixed effects because they are poorly identified separate
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from the group dummy variables.
The random variable ζig is common to all products in group g. Its distribution
function depends on parameter σ. The nested logit model is consistent with random-
utility maximization if 0 ≤ σ < 1. Individual i’s preferences are perfectly uncorrelated
across groups if σ = 0, in which case the model collapses into the simple logit demand
model. If σ = 1, preferences are perfectly correlated across groups, which implies that
the demand equation can be estimated separately for each group of products.
The distributional assumption on ij and the presence of a so-called “outside good”
with utility that is normalized to 0 (δ0 = 0) as defined below lead to the following
closed form of product demand.
ln(qj/(M −
N∑
k=1
qk)) = δj + σln(sj|gt), (2)
where ln(sj|g) denotes the natural logarithm of product j’s market share in ATC/strength
group g (g ∈ G) and the term M denotes total market size and implicitly defines the
size of the outside good, which is given by q0 = M −∑Nk=1 qk. The outside good is a
composite good. It consists of products that are purchased by the patients instead of
the “inside products,” which in our case are statins. These include, for example, the
purchase of homeopathic products, a bicycle or a pair of running shoes. Its price is
not set in response to the prices of the inside goods. Note that Scenario 3 collapses
into Scenario 2 for α = 0 and σ = 0, i.e., when demand is completely price-inelastic
and preferences are uncorrelated.
Potential market size
We define total market size as the amount of DDDs that would be sold if all potential
patients received medication. We calculate the number of potential patients based
on a claim by the Danish Association of Heart Patients (Hjerteforeningen, 2007) that
80 percent of all Danish residents above the age of 50 have a cholesterol level that is
too high. That figure may appear large, but given a total population of 5.5 mil., it
matches well with IRF’s (IRF, 2006) estimate that 2.1 mil. Danish residents above
the age of 35 have a total cholesterol level of more than 5 mmol/l. Because DDD is in
daily per-patient units, the potential market size can be easily computed as 80 percent
of all Danish residents above the age of 50.
Decreasing potential market size, for example, by assuming a lower fraction of
people with cholesterol levels that are too high, generates higher elasticities of sub-
stitution. Our assumption of a comparatively large market size of the outside good
therefore lets us generate conservative estimates of substitution.
Demand prediction
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Total demand for product j is defined as follows.
qˆj = M
exp(δˆj)
Dˆσˆg
∑G
g=1 Dˆ
(1−σˆ)
g
where Dˆg =
∑
j∈G
exp(δˆj/(1− σˆ). (3)
We calculate average demand for each product j based on the average prices in the
base period as calculated by our PMGE regression. These averages are predictions for
the treatment period and are exact mappings for the base period. In logit-type demand
models, there is a perfect match between actual and fitted demand by construction.
Alternative estimators
Nested logit models of demand have been criticized ever since Berry et al. (1995)
introduced the random coefficients model, which is also based on the assumption of iid
Gumbel distributed idiosyncratic utility components but which generates much more
flexible patterns of substitution. A practical difficulty with the random coefficients
model is, however, that its estimation requires prices (or other characteristics) to
vary across different markets. This is theoretically discussed by Nevo (2000) and
empirically shown by Kaiser and Song (2009). Our price and characteristics data do
not vary across sub-markets, as prices and co-payments are uniform across Denmark,
which is why we resort to our nested logit model.
As a robustness check, we also estimated a nested logit model with an additional
nest for branded versus unbranded drugs, thereby introducing additional flexibility into
demand estimation. The additional nest did not, however, prove to be statistically
significant on any conventional significance level, which is why we rejected the four-
level nested logit model in favor of our three-level nested logit model.
Finally, we also included LMAs other than statins in our analysis to investigate
if the claim medical practitioners that these products constitute a separate subgroup
is corroborated empirically. We indeed find evidence that other LMA products are
to be treated separately because their inclusion leads to an estimate of σ statistically
insignificantly different from one.
7.2 Identification
The unobserved characteristics of product j, ξjt, are known to both producers and
patients, which implies that prices are endogenous in equilibrium and must be instru-
mented. Not instrumenting prices leads to downwardly biased estimates of the price
coefficient α. By the same token, within group market shares, sj|gt must be instru-
mented as well. We estimate our demand equation using GMM, and we justify our
instrument choice below.
The obvious alternative to IV estimation is to control for unobserved quality char-
acteristics. In principle, this is possible in our setting because the characteristics of
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pharmaceutical products are also time-invariant. Estimating Equation (2) by fixed
effects would hence solve the identification problem. The grouping of products is,
however, time-invariant, which makes it impossible to separately identify the fixed
effects and the parameters related to the shares within substitution groups.
We make two main identifying assumptions. First, we assume that (unobserved)
cost factors are common across products in their own (sub-) market and that other
(demand-side) shocks specific to the (sub-) market are not correlated with these fac-
tors, an approach adopted by Kaiser and Wright (2006) similar to that used by Haus-
man and Taylor (1981), Hausman et al. (1994) as well Berry et al. (1995). This
implies that prices of other products of the same producer are assumed to be driven
by common underlying cost factors associated with a producer’s production and distri-
bution. These costs also determine a particular product’s price, but they are assumed
to be uncorrelated with the unobserved component of mean utility, ξj . This is why the
average price of a producer’s products in the other sub-markets may serve as instru-
ments for price. We define sub-markets by the type of active ingredient and not by the
narrower terms of substitution groups to increase the orthogonality of our instrument.
Second, we assume that (unobserved) cost factors are common across products of
other producers in the substitution group. These factors are not correlated with unob-
served product characteristics. A product’s unobserved quality is therefore assumed
not to be correlated with observed product characteristics of the products of other
producers in the same segment. We use the average price of the products of other
producers in the same segment as an additional price instrument.
We also include a cost-side variable as an instrument for prices (namely, an index
for pulp and paper prices) to account for packaging costs. We would ideally interact
this cost-side variable with product-specific fixed effects or at least with producer-
specific fixed effects to introduce between-product variation in these variables. This,
however, led to a statistical rejection of our orthogonality assumption, possibly because
we could not include product or producer-specific fixed effects as they are not well-
identified separately from the G substitution group dummy variables we implicitly
already take into account.
To instrument within group market shares, we follow Bonnet et al. (2006), who
assume that a “suitable” projection of the within group market shares on a hyperplane
generated by lagged values generates valid instruments. Identification of the coefficient
for within-group market shares is essentially based on the assumption that past market
shares are uncorrelated with unobserved product characteristics once product-specific
fixed effects are controlled for. To improve the precision with which we estimate the
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within-group correlation parameter, σ, we also include two lags of that variable.14
For an instrument to be valid, it requires two properties. First, there must be
no correlation between the instrument and the unobserved product characteristics.
Second, the instruments must predict the endogenous variable well. The first property
can be verified by tests for over-identifying restrictions. This test yields a test statistic
of 7.9, which, given 5 degrees of freedom, generates a marginal significance level of
0.16. We therefore cannot reject that our instruments are orthogonal to the error term
in the demand equation. The second property can be informally tested by running
“first stage” regressions of the endogenous variable on the explanatory variables and
the set of instruments. Clearly, there is no “first stage” in GMM estimation, but if
(the joint) statistical significance of the instruments cannot be rejected, evidence that
the second property holds is found. Appendix C displays such “first stage” regressions
and shows that our instruments are both jointly and separately highly statistically
significant. They hence fulfill both statistical requirements for instrument validity.
8 Demand Effects and Results
8.1 Demand effects
Estimation results for Equation (2) are shown in Table 6. We display both the OLS and
the GMM results. They differ quite substantially. The coefficient on co-payment, α,
is six times larger in the GMM estimation than in the OLS estimation. The coefficient
for within-group market shares, σ, is 4.6 times smaller, which is a typical finding and
consistent with our expectations. We shall use the GMM estimates only because these
are unbiased and consistent (given the instrument choice).
The coefficient on price per DDD, specified as patient co-payment, is negative and
highly statistically significant. It does not have a direct economic interpretation and
thus must be converted into price elasticities. The respective formulas are presented
in Berry (1994). Our estimated mean own-price elasticity is 0.5 percent, which does
not differ much from Gemmill et al. (2007), who summarize estimates for own-price
elasticities found in the literature on drug demand.
Insert Table 6 about here.
The within-group correlation parameter σ is estimated at 0.13, which is statistically
significantly different from both 0 and 1. Patient preferences are therefore moderated
14Our estimated σ is statistically significant at the five percent level without including additional lags. Our
estimation results do not differ at all with or without these lags, but including them increases the significance of
the estimates.
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at the substitution group level, which confirms that inter-substitution group competi-
tion does exist, but it is weak.
8.2 Reform effects on prices and demand
Table 7 displays our estimation results for Scenario 3. The changes in list prices,
reference prices and co-payments are exactly the same as in Scenario 2 by construction.
We redisplay them merely to facilitate the interpretation of our results. Any additions
as compared to Table 5 are the results of changes in demand per DDD as well as our
estimates for the per-DDD changes in producer revenues and government and patient
expenditures. For Scenarios 1 and 2, these changes coincide with the changes in the
respective relevant prices because demand was assumed to stay constant.
Insert Table 7 about here.
We estimate an average increase in sales per DDD of 35.7 percent. However,
demand does not uniformly increase for all pills. More than one quarter of the products
experienced an increase in co-payments, and per-DDD demand decreased for more than
one quarter of the products.
Mean (median) changes in producer revenues are estimated to be -23 (-21.9) per-
cent per DDD, and mean (median) changes in government expenditures are -10.7 (-25)
percent per DDD. Finally, mean (median) changes in patient expenditures per DDD
are -16.1 (-13.7) percent. These per-DDD changes translate into a positive change
in total demand for statins by 1.9 percent, a decrease in producer revenues of 5 per-
cent, a decrease in government expenditures of 5.6 percent, and a decrease in patient
expenditures by 3 percent.
The reductions in total revenues, government expenditures and patient expendi-
tures are quite dissimilar to those found in Scenario 2, where we assumed that demand
remained constant and for which we found increases in producer revenues, government
expenditures and patient expenditures. Once we consider demand changes, the signs
of the total effects reverse. This implies both that patients do react to price changes
by adjusting total demand and that they switch toward cheaper products. Policy
analyses that are based on price changes alone may therefore lead to quite misleading
results.
8.3 Patient surplus
Patient surplus, or consumer surplus as it is usually called, is the final measure of
change induced by the reform that we consider. It is a monetary measure of the
attractiveness of the set of products available to patients, including the outside good,
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minus the co-payment that a patient incurs. We use the parameter estimates of our
demand model to calculate this measure. It is defined by the maximum value of patient
utilities. Under the assumptions of the nested logit model, our estimated net patient
surplus, PS, is defined as follows (Anderson et al. 1992).
PˆS =
1
αˆ
ln
(
1−
G∑
g=1
Dˆg
1−σˆ)
. (4)
The “treatment on the treated” change in patient surplus between the base period
and the implementation period is the surplus change associated with the general price
reduction that was induced by the reform. Considering those 95 products that were
available in both the treatment and basis periods, we obtain an estimate for patient
surplus for the base period of 2.17 DKK per DDD, which translates into a patient
surplus of the same amount per day given that patients take one DDD per day. For
the treatment period, we find an estimate of 2.35 DKK per DDD, which is an increase
in patient surplus by 8.2 percent.
8.4 Asymmetric price effects
Table 8 adds evidence on asymmetric reform effects to the preliminary discussion in
Subsection 6.1. It contains the same information as Table 7, but it splits the results
between cheap and expensive products. The table shows that relative decreases in list
prices as well as in reference prices were not only larger for expensive products than for
the cheap ones, but prices of many initially cheap products actually increased due to
the reform. Co-payments decrease for initially expensive products, while they increase
for the cheap products. Demand decreases for low-price products, but it increases for
high-price products.
Insert Table 8 about here.
These differences are reflected by changes in producer revenues, government expen-
ditures and patient expenditures. They all decreased much less (or even increased)
for cheap products than for expensive products. Total producer revenue per DDD de-
creased by 21.9 percent for expensive products and by 0.7 percent for cheap products.
Total government expenditures decreased by 32.8 percent for expensive products and
by 1.2 percent for cheap products.
While total patient expenditures increased by 0.9 percent for cheap products, they
decreased by 9.75 percent for expensive products.
This asymmetry of the effects between initially expensive and initially cheap prod-
ucts implies that patients who purchased products priced below or at the EU average
price before the reform were actually made worse off, while patients who initially
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brought the more expensive products were made substantially better off. Moreover,
our results indicate that most of the benefits to government expenditures were due to
the initially expensive products.
9 Robustness checks
To check if our results critically depend upon our estimated price and within-group
correlation parameters, α and σ, we re-calculated the total effect of the reform on
demand, producer revenue and patient expenditures.
If we double α, which means we double the own-price and cross-price elasticities
of demand, this leads to larger effects from the reform on demand and prices both
at the product level and in aggregate. The effects on producer revenues, government
expenditures and patient expenditures decrease by around 14 percentage points more
compared to the results based on our estimated coefficients. Moreover, while asym-
metry of the effects across products remains, the differences become smaller.
If we double σ, which means we reduce the price elasticities of demand, we find
overall effects that differ little from our initial results. Even if we quadruple σ, the
total effect on producer revenues, government expenditures and patient expenditures
do not differ by more than 5 percentage points.
10 Conclusion
Denmark, which maintains a universal coverage health care system, changed the way
reference prices for prescription drugs are calculated on April 1, 2005. Before the
reform, reference prices were calculated based on the average European prices within
respective substitution groups. Reference prices have been calculated as the national
minimum price in the substitution group since then.
This paper investigates the joint effects of the reference price reform on prices
and demand for statins, which are products that reduce blood cholesterol levels to
prevent cardiovascular diseases. We first estimate the effects of the reference price
reform on prices and then estimate a model of demand for differentiated products
to finally link the estimated price effects to our demand estimates, which enables
us to derive counterfactual results not only for price changes but also for changes
in demand, producer revenues, patient expenditures, government expenditures and
patient surplus.
Our results support previous studies by finding a substantial decrease in prices
as a reaction to the reform. List prices decreased by 26.6 percent on average, and
reference prices decreased substantially with an average decrease of 31.8 percent. The
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average decrease in co-payments was estimated to be 7.5 percent. These price changes
are associated with an increase in total demand by 1.9 percent per 14 days. Total
producer revenues decreased by 5 percent, total government expenditures decreased
by 5.6 percent, and total patient expenditures decreased by 3.0 percent. Finally,
patient surplus increased by 8.2 percent for those products that existed both during
the period before the reform and during the implementation period of the reform.
The reference price reform therefore brought about sizeable reductions in both gov-
ernment and patient expenditures, but the reductions are quite unequally distributed
across products, which is a finding that is consistent with Lach and Moraga-Gonza´lez’s
(2009) study of Dutch gasoline stations. The list prices of initially cheap products (i.e.,
products that were initially priced at the EU average) decreased by 5.8 percent, and
initially expensive products (i.e., products that were initially priced above the EU
average) fell by 44.1 percent. Therefore, the patients who purchased cheap products
before the reform were made worse off, while patients who initially brought more ex-
pensive products were made substantially better off. We also find that prices decreased
substantially more for products belonging to expensive substitution groups, relative
again to the EU average price, than for products belonging to cheap substitution
groups. This result goes against theoretical expectations. We explain this by noting
that adjustments in the market structure were driven by differences in competitive
pressure across substitution groups rather than by the reference price reform itself.
An important question involves to what extent the experience from the Danish
reference price reform can inform policy makers elsewhere. The first issue to notice
here is that the change in the calculation of the reference price has surprisingly strong
effects. Indeed, the price reductions following the Danish adjustment of the reference
price were even larger than the price reductions following the introduction of reference
pricing in Germany (Pavcnik, 2002). There is no doubt that reference pricing must
be complemented with other rules and regulations for generic competition to work
well. Automatic generic substitution, which provides a constant profit margin across
products for pharmacies, and a formal application procedure whereby doctors prescribe
a specific, more expensive product surely spurred generic competition and helped to
realize gains from the reform. Still, we believe that the Danish experience provides
some general insights concerning the choice of reference prices. Defining the lowest
price in the substitution group as the reference price has a number of properties
that stimulate competition. First, because patients pay the full price difference when
buying a product that is different from the cheapest one, they are as price sensitive as
they would be without reimbursement from the health insurance. More price elastic
demand, in turn, results in tougher competition and lower prices. Second, using
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the European average price, or any other external benchmark, as the reference price
makes demand more elastic above the reference price than below it. This introduces
a tendency for producers to set prices equal to the reference price (Danzon and Liu,
1998; Kaiser et al., 2010). For such a system to work well, policy makers must be
able to devise rules that solve the difficult task of setting reference prices close to
the competitive level, a problem that they do not face when the reference price is
the lowest national price in the substitution group. In this sense, the Danish reference
price reform shows that the best institution at setting competitive prices is the market.
This view is supported by the Norwegian experience, in which pharmaceutical prices
fell significantly when a price cap based on European average prices was replaced by
reference prices calculated on the basis of domestic prices, as in Denmark (Brekke et
al. 2009a,b).
This paper leaves plenty of space for further research. Our analysis is confined to
products that existed both before the reform and after the reform, while it is silent
about the reform effects on products that entered or exited in the meantime. Neither
can we say anything substantive about the entry-inducing effects of the reform, nor
can we make any predictions about the effects of the reform on the entry of new drugs.
These issues are clearly of utmost importance, but they are far outside the scope of
the present paper.
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Table 2: Summary of events related to changes in the Danish reimbursement system
LIF Agreement May 03 2001
Apr. 14 2003
Since 2001 LIF members and the Danish Ministry of Health
have an agreement on price ceiling running until 2005. Not
all active companies follow the agreement.
Adjustment Apr. 28 2003
Sep. 01 2003
The Danish Medicine Agency starts updating pharmaceuti-
cal prices every 14 days. Before, reimbursement prices were
set every 6 months
Base - Working
group
Sep. 15 2003
Jun. 07 2004
The Danish Ministry of Health announces to assemble a
working group that is asked to submit proposals regarding
reimbursement rules with the aim to increase competition.
The Association of Danish Pharmacies launches the idea
that reimbursements should be based on the cheapest do-
mestic product within substitute groups. The idea earns
widespread support among leading politicians
Announcement Jun. 21 2004
Mar. 28 2005
The law regarding the new reimbursement system is passed
by the Danish parliament
Implementation Apr. 01 2005
Sep. 25 2006
The new law is implemented
New LIF agree-
ment
since
Oct. 29 2006
The LIF and the government agree upon on a price ceiling
corresponding to the price on 30 Aug. 2006
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Table 6: Results for OLS and GMM demand estimations
OLS GMM
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
α -0.03 0.01 -0.18 0.07
σ 0.60 0.02 0.13 0.05
Constant -3.55 0.79 -6.09 8.48
# obs. 2’640 2’640
Own price effects (mean) -0.50
Table 6 displays OLS and GMM estimation results for the demand
equation. Standard errors are robust to serial correlation and het-
eroskedasticity. The specification also includes product name dummies,
monthly dummies, quadratic and linear time trends.
Table 7: Percentage effect of regulatory change on prices
Scenario 3
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Mean
pl List price in DDD -64.06 -53.85 -24.84 -6.85 4.20 -26.60
pr Reference price in DDD -62.81 -57.87 -35.23 -7.18 4.75 -31.75
pc Co-payment price in DDD -74.31 -54.71 -15.91 3.64 32.01 -7.52
q Demand in DDD -15.47 -0.95 4.15 17.15 38.91 35.69
Firm revenues -59.38 -44.57 -21.89 -2.40 3.97 -23.00
Government expenditures -62.14 -49.43 -24.99 -1.42 4.62 -10.67
Patient expenditures -66.82 -47.37 -13.67 2.06 16.56 -16.06
Total demand change: 1.91
Total change in producers revenue: -4.96
Total change in government expenditures: -5.61
Total change in patients expenditures: -3.03
# products: 95
Table 7 displays price and demand changes associated with the reform. Changes are
measured in DDD per period.
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Table 8: Percentage change products in low and high price segment
Price segment
in base period
Scenario 3
10% 25% 50% 75% 90% Mean
Products
initially low
priced
pl List price in DDD -36.59 -22.08 -6.85 2.82 7.65 -5.76
pr Reference price in DDD -58.12 -28.80 -7.13 2.82 7.65 -15.22
pc Co-payment price in DDD -26.73 -13.27 -0.83 7.65 69.71 30.72
q Demand in DDD -33.15 -1.71 0.42 3.07 11.04 -6.09
Firm revenues -45.71 -20.18 -4.52 1.80 3.83 -14.71
Government expenditures -55.77 -28.54 -5.80 0.48 3.43 -18.63
Patient expenditures -28.54 -13.88 -2.12 3.26 7.63 0.95
Total demand change: -10.60
Total change in producer revenue: -0.74
Total change in government expenditures: -1.16
Total change in patient expenditures: 0.94
# products: 42
Products
initially high
priced
pl List price in DDD -70.27 -59.50 -48.31 -24.14 -11.99 -44.04
pr Reference price in DDD -66.14 -59.61 -48.80 -34.51 -16.86 -44.86
pc Co-payment price in DDD -81.14 -69.34 -50.28 -13.34 17.69 -39.52
q Demand in DDD -6.17 4.53 15.19 27.36 81.45 70.65
Firm revenues -60.44 -51.95 -40.75 -21.03 21.24 -29.93
Government expenditures -63.32 -55.26 -43.89 -21.00 29.54 -4.00
Patient expenditures -71.39 -57.90 -37.81 -5.59 19.42 -30.29
Total demand change: 18.00
Total change in producer revenue: -21.87
Total change in government expenditures: -32.78
Total change in patient expenditures: -9.75
# products 53
Table 8 displays price and demand changes associated with the reform for products that initially priced
below or equal to the EU average (cheap products) and those that priced above the EU average (expensive
products). All changes are measured in changes per DDD per period.
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Appendix A: Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification for C10
2-Level 3-Level 4-Level 5 - Level
C10
Lipid
Modifying
Agents
C10A
C10AA
HMG CoA
reductase
inhibitors
(Statins)
C10AA01 simvastatin
C10AA02 lovastatin
C10AA03 pravastatin
C10AA04 fluvastatin
C10AA05 atorvastatin
C10AA06 cerivastatin
C10AA07 rosuvastatin
C10AA08 pitavastatin
C10AB
Fibrates
C10AB01 clofibrate
C10AB02 bezafibrate
C10AB03 aluminium clofibrate
C10AB04 gemfibrozil
C10AB05 fenofibrate
C10AB06 simfibrate
C10AB07 ronifibrate
C10AB08 ciprofibrate
C10AB09 etofibrate
C10AB10 clofibride
C10AC
Bile acid
sequestrants
C10AC01 colestyramine
C10AC02 colestipol
C10AC03 colextran
C10AC04 colesevelam
C10AD
Nicotinic acid
and derivatives
C10AD01 niceritrol
C10AD02 nicotinic acid
C10AD03 nicofuranose
C10AD04 aluminium nicotinate
C10AD05 nicotinyl alcohol (pyridylcarbinol)
C10AD06 acipimox
C10AD52 nicotinic acid, combinations
C10AX
Other lipid
modifying
agents
C10AX01 dextrothyroxine
C10AX02 probucol
C10AX03 tiadenol
C10AX05 meglutol
C10AX06 omega-3-triglycerides incl. other esters and acids
C10AX07 magnesium pyridoxal 5-phosphate glutamate
C10AX08 policosanol
C10AX09 ezetimibe
C10AX10 alipogene tiparvovec
C10B
C10BA
combinations
C10BA01 lovastatin and nicotinic acid
C10BA02 simvastatin and ezetimibe
C10BX
combinations
C10BX01 simvastatin and acetylsalicylic acid
C10BX02 pravastatin and acetylsalicylic acid
C10BX03 atorvastatin and amlodipine
Appendix A displays a detailed classification of lipid modifying agents with their respective ATC codes.
Source: WHO Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology.
Only boldfaced chemical substances are marketed in Denmark.
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Appendix B: LMAs market shares
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Statins 90.91 92.50 91.92 90.53 88.89 87.04
Fibrates 6.06 4.00 3.54 4.74 3.17 3.09
Bile acid sequestrants 1.82 1.50 1.52 1.58 1.59 2.47
Nicotinic acid and derivatives 1.21 1.00 1.52 1.58 0.53 0.62
Other lipid modifying agents . 1.00 1.52 1.58 2.65 3.09
Combinations . . . . 3.17 3.70
Total No. of products 165 200 198 190 189 162
Appendix B displays market shares in percentage corresponding to each
lipid modifying agents by type and year.
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Appendix C: First stage results
Coeff. Std. err.
price of other products in same group -0.193 0.019
price own products in other groups 0.104 0.017
packaging other products in own group 0.047 0.003
pulp and paper 0.133 0.082
lagged market shares 1 -4.696 1.260
lagged market shares 2 -1.635 1.593
lagged market shares 3 4.909 1.289
Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err.
Name 1 -1.809 0.270 Name 18 -6.587 0.315
Name 2 0.023 0.232 Name 19 -5.336 0.390
Name 3 -2.004 0.268 Name 20 -5.839 0.188
Name 4 -0.618 0.308 Name 21 -6.594 0.208
Name 5 -3.157 0.230 Name 22 -0.852 0.605
Name 6 -3.793 0.325 Name 23 -1.614 0.300
Name 7 -3.698 0.292 Name 24 -0.339 0.213
Name 8 -3.731 0.515 Name 25 -6.487 0.163
Name 9 -1.622 0.201 Month 3 0.112 0.192
Name 10 -6.329 0.176 Month 4 0.259 0.323
Name 11 -1.140 0.272 Month 5 0.286 0.452
Name 12 0.221 0.240 Month 6 0.231 0.630
Name 13 -5.195 0.197 Month 7 0.644 0.743
Name 14 -6.634 0.161 Month 8 0.197 0.464
Name 15 -3.939 0.275 Month 9 0.170 0.345
Name 16 -5.872 0.200 Month 10 0.338 0.293
Name 17 -5.002 0.197 Period 1 0.216 0.393
Constant -14.439 10.138 Period 2 -0.003 0.005
F-test results
All instruments 99.49
Price instruments 71.39
Within groups market shares 110.90
Appendix C displays the results for the first stage regressions.
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